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TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
NON-INDIAN POLLUTERS OF RESERVATION WATERS
JAMES

M.

GRUALVA*

With respect to natural resource management concerns, Mr.
President, no one has greater respect and reverence for the land
than the original inhabitants of this continent. Although there
are differences among the tribes, we have a common set of
beliefs and traditions regarding our responsibilities as
caretakers for the natural world. In our philosophy, we are part
of and inseparable from the natural world, linked together by
the gifts of life and spirit. The remaining base of Indian lands
is doubly precious to us and must be managed for preservation
and production purposes ....
[W]e seek your support for the
rights of Indian tribes to exercise primary jurisdiction over
natural resource management within the boundaries of our
reservations.
- gaiashkibos,**President
National Congress of American Indians

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1994, at an historic meeting between leaders of the First Nations
of the United States and President Bill Clinton, gaiashkibos thus
reaffirmed the desire of Indian tribal governments to play a substantial
role in the decisions that affect tribal natural resources and the quality of
reservation environments. Ten years earlier, federal environmental law
and policy had begun the process of including tribal governments in
such decisions.l Thereafter, small but important windows of opportunity
began to appear through which one could envision tribal governments
exercising regulatory authority over the extent and manner of resource
development and the attendant environmental impacts on reservation

* Asst. Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. J.D. Northwestern School
of Law of Lewis & Clark College, 1989. Thanks are due to Rosie Martinelli for her able research
assistance.
** Letter from gaiashkibos, President, National Congress of American Indians, to Bill Clinton,
President of the United States, 3 (April 14, 1994) (summarizing tribal priorities for discussion at a
presidential meeting with American Indian tribes and Alaska Native villages on April 29, 1994) (on
file with author).
1. See infra text accompanying notes 6-20.
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lands.2 The question in the 1990s is whether the federal government will
support opening these windows, and whether the tribes will then seize the
opportunities presented.
Tribal leaders have strong incentives to urge the federal government
to open the windows. From time immemorial, the original inhabitants of
the North American continent have maintained a close physical and
spiritual connection with the natural world. Their vision that humans are
caretakers and guardians of nature implies an individual and governmental responsibility to use nature's resources with respect and
reverence. For thousands of years, that responsibility was discharged
within the framework of custom and tradition guiding the tribe's
citizenry on tribal lands.
But contemporary society creates pressures unknown in former
times. Federal agencies feel pressure to allow private development on
reservation lands. State agencies feel pressure to allow development on
state lands adjacent to reservations. Tribal governments are no different;
they also have citizens with important needs and interests and they feel
the pressure of those who would develop tribal resources to satisfy those
needs. But of course, natural resource development has attendant
impacts on the quality of the Nation's environment. And environmental
pollution tends to be migratory; water and air contamination do not
respect political boundaries. Pollution emitted on state or federal lands
may likely come to rest on tribal lands, and the opposite is also true.
Tribal governments recognize that others' decisions for on and
off-reservation development are likely to affect the health and welfare of
tribal citizens and the quality of reservation environments.
Hence
gaiashkibos' request that President Clinton support federal policy
providing tribal governments a seat at the table. Their presence helps to
close the circle of environmental protection by ensuring that all lands in
the United States are fully considered in the decision-making process.
More importantly, tribal regulatory control over the reservation
environment ensures that the tribe's value judgments about conservation,
development, and stewardship influence the ultimate decision.
This article addresses one of the windows in federal environmental
law through which Indian tribal governments might exercise substantial
influence over activities that impact the quality of reservation surface
waters. Section II briefly discusses the background of federal law and
policy regarding the protection of reservation water quality. Section III
describes how Indian tribes may receive delegation of the water quality
2. See infra text accompanying note 23.
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standards program under the federal Clean Water Act, and how tribes can
develop such standards. Section IV explains the legal consequences of
EPA's approval of tribal water quality standards, and section V
concludes that such standards are potent mechanisms for tribal
governments to discharge their sovereign responsibility to protect tribal
citizens, lands, and natural resources.
II.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL POLICY FOR PROTECTING THE QUALITY OF RESERVATION WATERS

In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWPCA") and declared the national policy to eliminate the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters. 3 The Act's goal was to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. Although the FWPCA was silent on the issue of whether the
phrase "the Nation's waters" included waters on Indian lands, there was
little doubt that EPA had the authority and responsibility to implement
the Act in Indian Country. 4 Common sense compelled that conclusion:
the fact that surface water bodies characteristically cross jurisdictional
boundaries combined with the migratory nature of water contamination
meant that pollution flowed both to and from Indian reservations.
Hence, the national goals and the federal scheme of uniformity would be
frustrated by substantial islands of unregulated lands within the states .5
The practical need to implement the FWPCA on Indian reservations
arose during a time when the federal government's view of the roles of
tribal governments was changing dramatically. In 1968, President
Johnson had urged Congress to end the damage of the Termination Era
and support tribal self-determination in a partnership with American
Indian tribes. 6 In 1970, President Nixon echoed Johnson's criticism of
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972). The FWPCA was
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, and is now commonly known as the Clean Water Act or the
CWA. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-219,91 Stat. 1566-1611 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988)).
4. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (holding that
absent specific limitations, federal statutes of general applicability apply to Indian persons and Indian
property interests). In the environmental context, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA. 803 F.2d 545,555
(10th Cir. 1986) (applying the Safe Drinking Water Act to Indian lands); Washington Dept. of Ecology
v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (assuming without discussion that the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act delegated authority to EPA to regulate hazardous waste activities on
Indian lands); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the Clean Air Act to
Indian lands); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying the National
Environmental Policy Act to Indian lands).
5. See Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 555-56 (refusing to interpret the Safe Drinking Water Act
as not applying to Indian lands because that interpretation would contradict national policy and leave
vast areas of the nation subject to groundwater contamination).
6. See FF~ax S. CorEN, FEix S. C oENq's HAkDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDLAN LAW 185 (1982 ed). The
Termination Era, which began in the early 1940s. comprised the period during which official United
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the official policy of termination, and challenged Congress to enact
legislation empowering tribes to control the operation and management
of federal Indian programs.7 Although Congress never did repudiate the
House Resolution which adopted termination as the nation's official
Indian policy,8 it did "restore" a previously "terminated" tribe in
1973,9 and enacted the Indian Self-Determination 1 0 and Education
Assistance Act of 1975.11

On January 24, 1983, President Reagan reaffirmed the principle of
tribal self-determination and the unique political relationship between
Indian tribes and the United States. 12 Reagan's view of tribal selfgovernment stemmed from a recognition that, like state and local
governments, tribal governments are more aware of the needs and
interests of their citizens than the federal government.1 3 As such, they
should have primary responsibility for establishing and implementing
programs intended to meet their citizens' needs. Economic development on reservations was, and is, one of those critical needs, and thus
Reagan supported the notion that tribes should have primary responsibility to determine the manner in which tribal natural resources would be
developed, as well as the regulatory and enforcement mechanisms
necessary to interact with the private sector for on-reservation development. 14
In November 1984, EPA took a significant but natural step toward
implementing Reagan's Indian policy in the environmental context and
became the first federal agency to adopt an Indian policy.15 EPA's
Indian Policy acknowledged tribal sovereignty by vowing to work on a
government-to-government basis with tribes rather than treating them as
subdivisions of states. 16 EPA also embraced its trust obligation to fully
consider tribal concerns and interests in implementing federal environ-

States' policy was the destruction of tribal governments as distinct political entities, and the termination
of the unique relationship between the tribes and the federal government. Id. at 152.
7. Id. at 186.
8. Id.
9. Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
903-903f (1988)).
10. Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975) (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988)).
11. Indian Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2213 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
450-450n, 455-458e (1988)).
12. Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary 1 (January 24, 1993).
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 4.
15. EPA, Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov.
8, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Indian Policy].
16. Id. at 1.
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mental regulatory programs on and near Indian reservations. 17 Because
tribes are often better situated to assess the impacts of economic
development and pollution on tribal interests, EPA promised to consult
and coordinate with tribes in making program decisions.18
Perhaps most importantly, EPA announced its intention to
recognize tribal governments as the primary parties for implementing
federal environmental laws; consistent with agency regulations, tribes
were to set standards, make environmental policy decisions, and manage
federal programs for reservations. 19 EPA also issued Implementation
Guidance, which directed regional administrators to set aside funds and
provide staff and technical assistance to tribes as they moved to assume
program responsibilities like the states.20
Apart from insufficient funding, limited tribal infrastructure, and
environmental regulatory inexperience,21 there was one basic problem:
Congress had not authorized EPA to delegate federal environmental
programs to Indian tribes. However, not two years later, Congress
followed EPA's lead and began a series of amendments to federal
environmental laws that envisioned the role of tribal governments in a
manner similar to the roles played by state governments.2 2 These
amendments acknowledge the sovereign status of Indian tribes by
authorizing EPA to treat tribes in substantially the same manner as states
for the purposes of implementing environmental programs and
23
regulating reservation environments.
17. Id. at 3. As a federal agency, EPA has an obligation to carry the Federal government's
fiduciary duty to act in good faith when taking actions that affect Indian tribes. See United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (holding that the Department of the Interior has a responsibility to
manage tribal timber resources to obtain the greatest benefit for the tribes).
18. See EPA Indian Policy, supra note 15, at 3.
19. See EPA Indian Policy, supra note 15, at 2. EPA reaffirmed its policy in 1991,
recommending the strengthening of tribal capacity for environmental management. Memorandum
from William K. Reilly, EPA, EPA/State/Tribal Relations, to Assistant Administrators, EPA (July 10,
1991).
20. Memorandum from Alvin J. Aim, EPA, Indian Policy Implementation Guidance, to Assistant
and Regional Administrators, EPA, (November 8, 1984). One year later, EPA adopted its interim
strategy for implementing the policy which recognized that "forcing tribal governments to act through
state governments that cannot exercise jurisdiction over [Indian tribes] is not an effective way of
implementing programs overall, and certainly is in opposition to the federal policy of working with
tribal governments directly." Interim Strategy for Implementation of the EPA Indian Policy, Office of
Federal Activities, Offices of External Affairs 11 (November 1985).
21. These problems were, of course, tremendous obstacles to the development of effective tribal
regulatory programs. They remain so today.
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-1 1 (1988) (codifying the 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-339); 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1988) (codifying the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-499); 33 U.S.C. §§2706(b)(4), (c)(3) (1988) (codifying the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
P.L. 101-380); 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1988) (codifying the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-549).
23. See also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 3113-118, (1992)
(containing the Indian Technical Amendments).
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III. TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF WATER
QUALITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT24
On February 4, 1987, Congress followed the trend toward
recognizing the sovereign authority of tribal governments to regulate
pollution sources affecting reservation environments by adding section
518 to the Clean Water Act ("CWA").25 Section 518 authorized EPA to
"treat an Indian tribe as a State" for certain CWA programs.26 The
"treatment" varied with the relevant program: treatment under section
106 meant the tribe was eligible to receive EPA grants for water
pollution control; 27 treatment under section 303 meant that EPA would
delegate to the tribe primary responsibility for setting standards to
protect the quality of reservation waters. 28 With this addition, Congress
made clear that EPA was to give Indian tribes the opportunity to assume
substantially the same duties, rights, and responsibilities as states for
implementing the CWA.

A. TRIBAL

ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE

CWA

PROGRAM DELEGATION

This historic opportunity, however, was not automatic; tribes could
receive such "treatment as a state" ("TAS") only after they met certain
threshold criteria (not applicable to states). EPA could approve tribes
for TAS only if:
1. The Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers;
2. The functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the
management and protection of water resources which are held by an
Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a
24. The author presented an earlier version of this section at the Fifth Annual Natural Resources
Management & Environmental Enforcement on Indian Lands Conference (Albuquerque, NM, 1993),
sponsored by the American Bar Association's Section on Natural Resources, Energy, and
Environmental Law. That earlier version was co-authored by Richard A. Du Bey and Michael P.
O'Connell.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988) (codifying the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-4).
26. Id. §1377(e) (stating that those CWA programs are Title II (Construction Grants), section 104
(Research, Investigation, and Training), section 106 (Grants for Pollution Control), section 303 (Water
Quality Standard), section 308 (Inspections, Monitoring, and Entry), section 309 (Federal
Enforcement), section 314 (Clean Lakes), section 402 (National Pollutant Discharge Elimaintain
System), and section 404 (Dredge and Fill Material)).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
28. Id. § 1313(a).
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member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust
restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation; and
3. The Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the
Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised
in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of [the CWA] and of
all applicable regulations.29
Congress then directed EPA to promulgate regulations specifying
how it would treat tribes as states under the CWA.30
Pursuant to section 518, EPA promulgated five regulations setting
forth criteria by which EPA will approve tribes for TAS for various CWA
programs.31 Each rule covered TAS requirements for one or several
programs; there was no one TAS regulation generic to all CWA
programs.32 However, most of the TAS requirements were substantially
similar so that once a tribe received TAS approval under one CWA
program, the tribe was only required to supplement its first TAS
application with information specific to the next desired program. 3 3
Generally, to qualify for TAS under EPA's rules, an Indian tribe
must demonstrate that it meets the following four criteria:
1. The tribe is federally recognized;
2. The tribe has a governing body capable of carrying out
substantial governmental functions;
3. The tribal government's functions include management and
protection of tribal water resources; and
4. The tribe is reasonably capable of carrying out the functions of
an effective water quality management program. 34

29. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
4 (1990).
30. Id.
31. See Safe Drinking Water Act, National Drinking Water Regulations, Underground Injection
Control Regulations; Indian Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,396 (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 35, 124,
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, and 146); Indian Tribes: Water Quality Planning and Management, 54 Fed.
Reg. 14,354 (1989); Comprehensive Construction Grant Regulation Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,092
(1990) (governing grant programs under the CWA) (codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 35 and 130);
Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian
Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. part 131); Clean Water Act, Section
404 Tribal Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 8,172 (1993) (codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 232 and 233); Treatment
of Indian Tribes as States for Purposes of Sections 308, 309,401,402, and 405 of the Clean Water Act
[NPDES rule], 58 Fed. Reg. 67,966 (1993) (codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 122, 123, 124 and 501).
32. 59 Fed. Reg. 13,820 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 123, 124, 131, 142, 144, 145,
233, and 501).
33. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(6) (1994) (providing TAS requirements for section 303 water
quality standards).
34. See 40 C.FR. § 131.8(a) (1994) (providing TAS requirements for section 303 water quality
standards); 40 C.F.R. § 130.6(d) (1994) (providing TAS requirements for section 106 pollution
prevention).
WATER QAULITY STANDARDS FOR INDIAN TRIBEs

440

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:433

In March 1994, EPA expressed its dissatisfaction with the TAS
approval process. 3 5 At that time, EPA's regulations viewed TAS
approval as a formal "prequalification process," whereby EPA would
first determine whether a tribe had the requisite qualities to be worthy of
the opportunity to apply for grants or program delegation under the
various CWA sections.36 For example, under section 303, the tribe had
to qualify for TAS before it was entitled to initiate the formulation and
adoption of water quality standards approvable by EPA.37
After several years of receiving and processing TAS applications,
very few tribes had actually received any substantive responsibilities
under the CWA.38 EPA was frustrated with the time-consuming nature
of the separate TAS prequalification step, and tribes were frustrated with
the lack of results (and also the phrase "treatment as a state" which
some saw as inherently offensive).39 Consequently, EPA announced a
new process in late 1994.40 Because section 518 mandates some form of
TAS determination, the new process retains the basic TAS requirements
of EPA's five prior regulations. 4 1 But TAS approval is no longer
separate from the underlying program approval; a tribe may now submit
its water quality standards for approval without having previously
"qualified" for TAS.42
1.

General Eligibility Requirementsfor Delegation of the
Water Quality StandardsProgram

The portion of a tribe's application for program delegation that
relates to the general eligibility requirements is relatively straightforward.
First, the application should state that the tribe is federally recognized
and include the Federal Register page that lists the tribe. 4 3 The
application should also include a narrative statement that describes the
form of tribal government, its sources of authority to govern, and the

35.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,820, 13,820-21 (1994) (stating that "The Agency's 'TAS'
prequalificaiton process has proven to be burdensome, time-consuming and offensive to tribes").
36. Id.
37. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(c)(5) (1994).
38. See 59 Fed. Reg. 38,460 (1994) (noting that by July 28, 1994, EPA had approved 90 tribal
TAS applications, but only three of those tribes had received approval for water quality standards
programs).
39. Id. at 13,821.
40. 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339 (1994) (providing the final rule on eligibility of Indian tribes for program
authorization under the CWA and the Safe Drinking Water Act).
41. Id.
42. Id.at 64,340.
43. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(1) (1994); see 53 Fed. Reg. 52,829, 52,829-32 (1988) (listing tribes
recognized for purposes of receiving federal services).
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types of governmental duties and functions (e.g., levying taxes,
exercising police power) currently performed by the governing body.44
EPA's third criterion is that the tribal government currently possess
authority over water quality management on the reservation. 4 5 The
standard does not require current tribal exercise of that authority, but
only an assertion of regulatory authority over the waters for which the
tribe proposes water quality standards ("WQS").46 The tribe's assertion
must be supported by a statement from the tribal attorney that explains
the basis for the assertion, along with copies of any documents like tribal
constitutions, bylaws, ordinances, and tribal council resolutions
supporting the assertion of authority. 47 Finally, the tribe must also
identify the areas and waters over which the tribe asserts its authority. 48
To meet EPA's fourth criterion, the tribe must convince the
Regional Administrator that the tribe either has, or can develop, the
capability to administer effectively the program at issue. 49 Previously,
EPA had required that the tribe describe its prior management
experience with federal programs like the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, the Indian Mineral Development Act, and the
Indian Sanitation Facility Construction Activity Act, 5 0 as well as any
experience with tribal environmental or health programs. 51 Under
EPA's new program eligibility rule, no specific documentation is
required; EPA will use its grant and program approval standards to
establish the statutory capability requirement. 52
Normally, of course, offering more rather than less information
about prior tribal management experience encourages EPA to find the
tribe capable. A narrative statement that describes the tribe's experience
and governmental structure is helpful. 5 3 The statement should identify
and describe the tribal agency primarily responsible for administering
the water quality standards program, 54 and its technical and administrative capabilities.55

44. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(2) (1994).
45. Id. § 131.8(b)(3).
46. Id. § 131.8(b)(3)(i).
47. Id. § 131.8(b)(3)(ii), (iii).
48. Id. § 131.8(b)(3)(i), (iv). See infra Part III.A.2 for a more detailed discussion of tribal
jurisdiction over reservation waters.
49. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(4) (1994).
50. Id. § 131.8(b)(4)(i).
51. Id. § 131.8(b)(4)(ii).
52. 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339, 64,341 (1994).
53. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(4)(iii) (1994).
54. Id. § 131.8(b)(4)(iv).
55. Id. § 131.8(b)(4)(v).

442

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:433

A tribe's lack of prior environmental management experience does
not automatically preclude it from demonstrating capability. 56 EPA
recognizes that many tribes are just beginning to build infrastructure
necessary to manage programs like the WQS program.57 Thus, the tribe
may satisfy the capability requirement by describing a plan that
proposes how the tribe will acquire the administrative and technical
expertise necessary to implement its program. 5 8 Particularly, the plan
must address how the tribe will obtain funds sufficient to acquire the
requisite expertise.
2.

Tribal Governmental Jurisdictionover Reservation Waters

The quick glance above at the requirements for program eligibility
implies that EPA approval is a relatively straightforward exercise of
explaining the governmental structure of the tribe and asserting that the
tribe has or can obtain the resources and infrastructure necessary to
implement the desired CWA programs for surface waters on the
reservation. At one level, that is true. But the implication glosses over
the seminal question usually raised by the exercise of governmental
powers in Indian Country: Who has jurisdiction over the on-reservation
persons and activities sought to be regulated? Indian reservations
typically consist of various portions of land owned by the United Sates
and held in trust for tribes or individual Indian peoples, and lands owned
in fee simple by non-Indians. 59 Even the casual reader of Indian law
knows that modern Supreme Court cases use the presence of non-Indian
landowners on reservations to avoid the logical and moral conclusion
that tribal governments should regulate persons and activities on-reservation, and state governments (and their subdivisions) should
regulate persons and activities off-reservation. 60
In the context of the CWA's section 303 WQS program, however,
there are at least two caveats to this issue. First, EPA makes the
determination of whether a tribe or state has adequate jurisdiction to
receive a CWA program delegation. EPA has uniformly refused to
56. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,882 (1991).
57. See 54 Fed Reg. 39,098, 39,101 (1989) (recognizing tribes have not had substantial
experience in administering surface water quality programs).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (b)(4)(v) (1994).
59. COHEN, supra note 6, at 136-38 (discussing the presence of non-Indian landowners as a
natural consequence of the Allotment Era, which partitioned huge areas of tribal communal lands into
parcels allotted to individual tribal members).
60. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989) (holding that the Yakima Indian Nation could not regulate the land uses of non-Indians in a
predominantly "non-Indian" area of the Nation's reservation).
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delegate to states the federal environmental authority to regulate Indian
lands.61 At least one circuit court has held EPA's interpretation
reasonable.62 Thus, under its current policy, if EPA chooses to delegate
programs for environmental regulation on reservations, it makes those
delegations to tribes.63 A reviewing court could determine that EPA's
basis for making a jurisdictional determination for a particular tribe is
insufficient on the administrative record, and overturn the decision. 6 4
But under established principles of administrative law, the court may not
then order the agency to delegate the program to the state for application to reservation waters. 6 5
The second caveat is that it is not necessarily clear that traditional
concerns of jurisdiction apply to the WQS program. As discussed
below,66 the adoption of tribal WQS offers tribes significant influence
over the decisions and activities that threaten the health and welfare of
tribal members and the quality of the reservation environment, but that
power is indirect. That is, until EPA delegates to the tribe a CWA
permitting program (like the section 402 NPDES permitting program), 67
any application of tribal WQS to non-Indians on fee lands will be made
by federal agencies, not the tribe. The tribe's adoption of WQS then,
does not seek to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands and
therefore the Supreme Court's view of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians on fee lands is inapposite.
Notwithstanding those two caveats, EPA and others still look to the
Supreme Court's current Indian law discourse to make tribal eligibility
determinations. It seems beyond question that tribal governments
possess jurisdiction over tribal members, whether they act on trust or fee
lands.68 The more lively discussion centers around the existence and
extent of tribal civil regulatory control over non-Indians on fee lands.

61. See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 34,954 (1983) (approving State of Washington's RCRA delegation
except as to Indian lands); 53 Fed. Reg. 39,088, 39,089 (1988) (approving State of Nevada's
delegation under the Safe Drinking Water Act except as to Indian lands); 59 Fed. Reg. 43,797 (1994)
(approving State of Louisiana's delegation under the Clean Air Act except as to sources on Indian
lands).
62. Washington Dept. of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985).
63. EPA has, however, consistently indicated its willingness to make partial delegation limiting
the tribe's approval to those land areas where the tribe demonstrates jurisdiction. See, e.g., 59 Fed.
Reg. 64,339, 64340 (1994).
64. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 549 (1978) (holding that court's role is to vacate agency's decision and remand for futher
consideration if record is insufficient to sustain the agency's initial decision).
65. Id.
66. See infra Section IV.C.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
68. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978).
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There are three possible sources for such tribal authority: federal
delegation, federal treaties, and inherent tribal sovereignty.
The most potent source of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is
federally-delegated power. 69 The issue is arguably raised by section 518
itself, which envisions that "the functions to be exercised by the Indian
tribe pertain to the management and protection of water resources which
are held by an Indian tribe . . . or [are] otherwise within the borders of
an Indian reservation." 7 0 Section 518 defines "Federal Indian
reservation" as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation ...
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including any rights-of-way running through the reservation." 7 1 Because Congress did not
limit section 518 authority only to trust lands on the reservation, it
arguably delegated federal power to tribes to exercise jurisdiction over
all waters on the reservation, regardless of any non-Indian uses of or
ownership rights in those waters.
EPA did not take that view. Instead, it found section 518 and its
legislative history ambiguous with respect to tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation. 72 In the face of those
ambiguities, and given that the issue was an important one not likely to
be treated lightly by Congress, EPA concluded that Congress intended
neither to expand nor restrict inherent tribal sovereignty. 7 3 EPA
determined that to make eligibility determinations under section 518, it
would look to the controlling precedent of the Supreme Court regarding
the civil regulatory authority of tribal governments.74
The second potential source of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
is a federal treaty. During the heady days of manifest destiny, the
federal government promised many tribes the "exclusive and undisturbed use and occupation" of designated lands in exchange for the
tribes' cession of huge tracts of other lands. 75 Those familiar with the
Euro-American system of property law understood those treaty terms to
mean that tribes could completely exclude non-Indians from the
reservations, or could allow them on the reservation only if they acted in
69. Cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (affirming federal conviction for
violation of tribal liquor ordinance on basis of a federal delegation to the Wind River Tribe to regular
liquor trade on the reservation).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2) (1988).
71. Id. § 1377(h).
72. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879-80 (1991).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 64,880.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 113 (1938) (addressing Shoshone
Tribe's property rights under an 1868 treaty that reserved to the Tribe the "absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation of its reservation").
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accordance with conditions specified by the tribal government. 7 6 The
Supreme Court agreed with that view, with one critical qualification: a
tribe loses its treaty-based right to regulate non-Indians on fee lands as
soon as Congress opens the reservation for non-Indian use and/or
ownership.7 7 The effect of the opening (i.e., the presence of nonIndians on the reservation) is the critical factor; Congress' purpose in
opening the lands is unimportant to the Court. 78 Thus, if a tribe suffered
the indignity of Congress' allotment policy, or had its lands taken for
national interests like flood control, it thereby lost any treaty right to
regulate the conduct of non-Indians on the areas opened to nonIndians .79
The third and most controversial source of potential tribal authority
is inherent sovereignty, which flows from a source other than the United
States Constitution and predates Congress and the Supreme Court. Its
precise contours have never been defined, but for several thousands of
years it was understood to encompass authority over tribal members and
tribal territories.8 0 In the last fifty years, however, the Supreme Court has
seemed intent on matching earlier efforts of the executive and legislative
branches in undermining the authority of tribal governments. In 1981,
the Court's decision in Montana v. United States8 1 announced the
"general proposition" that tribal governments lack sovereign authority
over the activities of non-members of the tribe on fee lands within the
reservation.82 The general rule has a needs-based exception, however,
that may be applicable in the environomental context. A tribe may
regulate "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political

76. Montana, 450 U.S. 564-65.
77. Id.
78. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309,2318 (1993).
79. See Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2315-16 (holding that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe lost its
treaty-based right to regulate non-Indians on waters overlying fee lands opened to non-Indian use by
federal flood control acts); Montana, 450 U.S. at 547-49 (holding that the Crow Tribe lost its
treaty-based right to regulate non-Indians on lands made available to non-Indian ownership through
Allotment Acts).
80. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-59 (1832) (stating that Indian Nations
are distinct political communities, having exclusive authority within their territorial boundaries, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial); Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557 (stating that Indian
tribes are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory").
81. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
82. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. Despite the weakness of the Court's reasoning, and its
misapplication of binding precedent leading to an "anomalous result," see id. at 569 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), it is clear that the Court as currently composed intends to follow Montana's "general
proposition." See Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2321.
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integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the
tribe."83

The Montana standard was put to the test in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation.8 4 In Brendale, the
Supreme Court addressed whether the Yakima Indian Nation or Yakima
County, Washington, had jurisdiction to zone non-Indian fee lands
within two distinct areas of the Yakima Reservation: the "closed" area
of the Yakima reservation was primarily owned by the Tribe and tribal
members and was not generally open to non-member use; the "open"
area was primarily owned in fee by non-Indians and Yakima County
provided governmental services to those landowners.85 The Justices split
4:2:3, so there was no majority rationale. The result, however, was not a
surprising leap from the new rule and exception announced in Montana.
In the closed area, where non-Indian activities were likely to impact
important tribal interests, five Justices held that the Yakima Indian Nation
had exclusive authority to zone fee lands. 8 6 In the open area, where
non-Indian activities were less likely to impact tribal interests, six Justices
held that the County had exclusive authority to zone fee lands.87
Some commentators viewed Brendale as a retreat from Montana's
exception for tribal authority over non-Indian activities affecting tribal
interests. 8 8 But despite the fractured approach of the Brendale Court, all
of the Justices relied to some extent on Montana's exception for tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indian activities affecting important tribal interests
and and the result was arguably consistent with Montana.89 Nevertheless,
a significant majority of the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
Montana's view of inherent tribal authority over non-Indians as the
governing test.
In South Dakota v. Bourland,90 the Court addressed a situation very
similar to Montana.9 1 The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe sought to
83. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. The court identified one other exception to the general rule:
a
tribe may also regulate the activities of non-Indians who enter consensual realtionships with the tribe
or its members. Id.
84. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
85. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 415-46
(1989).
86. Id. at 441-43 (Stevens, J., writing for the Court); id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 432 (White, J., writing for the Court); id. at 444-45 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
88. See, e.g., Peter W. Sly, EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual Approach, 20
ENvT'L L. RptR. 10429, 10434 (1990) (stating that "Justice Stevens' open/closed classifications would
effectively replace the doctrinal approach derived from the dicta of Montana's second exception").
89. Cf. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,877 (1991) (stating that "the primary significance of Brendale is
in its result, which was fully consistent with Montana").
90. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1992).
91. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. 2309 (1992).
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regulate the hunting and fishing activities of non-Indians on the Oahe
Reservoir, which overlies former trust and fee lands within the Tribe's
reservation. 9 2 The Reservoir was created when the Army Corps of
Engineers built the Oahe Dam for flood control purposes. 9 3 But the
Corps' enabling authority also directed that once created, the Reservoir
would be open for general recreational public use. 94 Like the Crow
Tribe in Montana, the Cheyenne River Sioux argued that it possessed
regulatory authority over non-Indians on the Reservoir under (1) its
treaty right to exclusive use and occupation of its reservation, and (2) its
inherent governmental sovereignty.95
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, first cited
Montana as support for the conclusion that regardless of its purpose,
when Congress opens Indian lands to non-Indian use, the tribe thereby
loses any treaty-based right to regulate the non-Indian activities.96 As to
the Tribe's inherent sovereignty, the Court quoted Montana's "general
proposition" that such powers do not extend to the activities of
non-Indians on fee lands, and its exception for regulating activities that
threaten or have a direct impact on the political integrity, economic
security, or health and welfare of the tribe. 9 7 But because the circuit
court had not passed on the district court's findings regarding impact of
the non-Indians' activities on tribal health and welfare, the Supreme
Court remanded that issue.
On remand, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Tribe had not met
Montana's standard for establishing jurisdiction over non-Indian
activities on the Reservoir. 9 8 The majority reviewed the district court's
findings that non-Indian hunters and fishers sometimes harassed Indian
cattle, left open pasture gates, took down fence wires, and killed deer
otherwise available for Indian subsistence uses.99 Although the majority
found these occurrences undeniably "vexatious" to the tribal members
92. Id. at 2313.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2319-20.
96. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2316.
97. Id. at 2319-20. Twisting the termination knife in the belly of federal Indian Law, Justice
Thomas boldly asserted that after Montana, tribal authority over non-Indians cannot survive without
congressional delegation "and is therefore not inherent." Id. at 2320 n.15. That assertion is flatly
contradicted by Montana's conclusion that "[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands, within its reservation when that conduct
threatens" certain tribal interests. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. Justice Thomas' assertion is also
contradicted by the Bourland result; although Bourland found no congressional delegation of authority
to the tribe to regulate non-Indians on the Oahe Reservoir, the Court remanded to the Eighth Circuit to
determine whether, under Montana, the Tribe had inherent authority to regulate on the basis of
impacts of the non-Indians' activities on tribal interest. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. at 2321.
98. South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 1994).
99. Id.
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affected, it could not hold as clearly erroneous the district court's
finding that such occurrences neither threatened nor had a direct effect
on the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of
the Tribe.' 0 0 However, the majority offered the Tribe a second chance if
in the future the "improper conduct of the non-Indian hunters and
fishermen on the taken area escalate[d] in severity so as to have a direct
effect" on the tribe's interests.101
The Montana test seems particularly well suited to tribal environmental regulation. Environmental regulation is an exercise of a
government's police power, which is intended to protect the health and
welfare of the government's citizenry. 10 2 EPA has quite logically
interpreted the CWA as a Congressional determination that activities that
pollute the Nation's surface waters present serious and substantial health
and environmental impacts. 1 0 3 That is especially true for Indian
reservations, where uncontaminated water for irrigation, fishing, and
other uses, and critical habitat for fish and animals, is absolutely crucial
to the survival of the reservation. 104 Whether pollutants come from
Indian activities on trust lands or from non-Indian activities on fee lands,
the water contamination presents serious and substantial impacts to tribal
health and welfare.
At least one commentator has argued for a less holistic look, urging
that in making tribal program eligiblity determinations, EPA should
prepare maps and tables showing the proportion of fee to trust lands,
Indian to non-Indian landowners, and whether any towns or special
districts exist on the reservation. 10 5 EPA has rejected such an approach,1 0 6 and for good reason. Environmental regulation is more
directly related to protecting the public health and welfare than the land
use zoning regulations addressed in Brendale, or the hunting and fishing
regulations addressed in Bourland.107 The importance of water quality
100. Id.
101. Id. at 870-71.
102. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987)
(describing Pennsylvania's mining regulations as an exercise of the state's police power to protect the
public interest in health and the environment).
103. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64, 878 (1991).
104. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-600 (1963); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878
(1991).
105. Sly, supra note 88, at 10,435. This approach stems from Justice Stevens' opinion in
Brendale, which focused on the "Indian" character of the closed area of the Yakima Indian Nation,
and the "non-Indian" character of the open area. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 438-44 (opinion of
Stevens, J.).
106. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881 (1991) (noting that under the WQS rule, a tribe is not
required to submit a map showing the location of fee and trust lands on the reservation).
107. Id. at 64, 879.
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regulation stems partly from the transport mechanism for water
pollutants (i.e., water in rivers, lakes, wetlands), which dramatiacally
increases their mobility. Thus, whereas zoning impacts are normally
discrete and localized, environmental health risks from water pollution
108
are transitory and may affect people miles from the pollution source.
In addition, as pollutants migrate they tend to mingle with one
another, and it becomes difficult if not impossible to separate out the
consequences of water quality impairment from different sources. 109 If
tribal members use any portion of the affected surface water, or use fish
and animal resources that use the affected surface water, the pollution
from non-Indian activities on fee lands is likely to affect tribal interests
(health, environmental, etc.) in the quality of that water. Thus, in one
sense, as the proportion of non-Indian polluters on the reservation
increases, so does the risk that Indian uses of those waters will be
restricted or eliminated.
Following this analysis, EPA believes that the impacts of water
pollution on reservations are sufficient to support tribal regulation of
non-Indian activities on fee lands under Montana.1l10 Yet, EPA still
requires a tribe seeking a program eligibility determination to submit a
legal analysis demonstrating that its particular circumstance meets the
test.II However, the tribe's submission need not be a treatise on tribal
jurisdiction. The tribe must simply demonstrate that:
1. There are surface waters and critical habitat within the tribe's
reservation that are covered by the CWA; and
2. Tribal members use those waters and/or critical habitat, and thus
may be exposed to pollutants present in or introduced into those waters
and habitat.1 12
The tribe must also explicitly assert that impairments of the quality
of reservation waters caused by non-Indian activities would have serious
and substantial effects on the health and welfare of the tribe.113
Within thirty days of receiving the tribe's application, EPA must
give notice to "all appropriate governmental entities." 1 14 Those
governmental entities have thirty days to raise competing or conflicting
jurisdictional claims, clearly explaining the substance, basis, and extent

108. Id.
109. Id. at 64,878.
110. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,878 (1991).
111. Id. at 64,879.
112. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,879 (1991).
113. Id.
114. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(c)(2)(ii) (1994). EPA interprets "appropriate governmental entities" to
include states, tribes, and federal agencies located contiguously to the applying tribe's reservation. 56
Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,884 (1991).
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of any objection.115 In the absence of objection, EPA presumes the
adequacy of a tribe's showing if it meets the basic requirements set out
above.' 16 If an adjacent state or tribe objects, EPA may seek additional
information from the tribe or the objecting party, or consult with other
federal agencies before making a final determination. 117 If EPA
determines that the tribe has shown its jurisdiction over surface waters of
the reservation, then it proceeds to determine if the tribe's proposed
WQS meet the requirements of the CWA.

B.

DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL WATER

QuALITY

STANDARD

The structure of the CWA contemplates two primary mechanisms
for achieving the national goals of restoring and maintaining the
integrity of the nation's waters: technology-based effluent standards
and water quality-based effluent standards. In the former category are
standards which set limits for specific pollutants that are based on the
technology available to control the discharge; these standards are set by
EPA on a nationwide basis without regard to the quality of the receiving
waters. 118
In contrast, water quality-based effluent standards ("WQS") are
established for particular water bodies or portions thereof by considering
site-specific factors unique to those receiving waters. WQS define the
water quality goals of a particular water body, and also serve as a basis
for regulatory controls on pollution sources beyond those imposed by
the technology-based standards.ll 9 Fundamentally, WQS consist of
designated uses desired to be made of a particular water body, and water
quality "criteria" sufficient to protect those uses. 120
1. Designation of Uses of Reservation Waters
The first step in the process of promulgating WQS is for the tribe to
identify (or "inventory") all surface waters and may include hydrologically connected groundwaters within the reservation environment
that require standards.121 In appropriate circumstances, tribes may
determine that certain artificially-created waters, like irrigation canals or
115. 59. Fed. Reg. 64,339, 64,340 (1994).
116. Id.at 64,340.
117. Id.
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1984); 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-471 (1994) (governing technology-based
effluent limitations for industrial categories). REFERENCE GUIDE TO WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
INDIAN TRIBES, EPA, 440/5-90-002, at 1 (January 1990) [hereinafter EPA WQS GUIDE].
119. EPA WQS GUIDE supranote 118, at 1.
120. Id.at 1.
121. Id. at 6.
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ditches, warrant protection through the development and implementation
of WQS.122
The tribe then develops "use classification systems," which assign
specific "uses" to the identified waters. 12 3 These are the uses that the
tribe currently makes or desires to make of the identified waters. At a
minimum, the CWA requires that the tribe protect recreational uses in
and on the water, and uses by fish, shellfish, and wildlife for protection
and propagation. 124 The tribe has the discretion to adopt other use
categories and subcategories appropriate to their reservations, so long as
those uses and associated water quality criteria are consistent with the
purposes of the CWA.125 Uses likely to be protected would include:
public drinking water supplies; irrigated agriculture; recreational
activities; power generation; industrial and commercial activities; and
cultural or religious activities. Where uses are only practical during
specific seasons, a tribe may develop means to protect the CWA's
fishable/swimmable goals on a seasonal basis.126
If the tribe designates uses that do not include fishable/swimmable
uses, the tribe must conduct a "use attainability analysis."12 7 A use
attainability analysis is a "scientific assessment of the physical, chemical,
biological, and economic factors" affecting whether a use can be
attained. 12 8 In particular, the assessment consists of a survey and
assessment of the relevant water body, a wasteland allocation, and, if
appropriate, an economic analysis. 129 Those analyses assist the tribe in
determining which uses of reservation waters are possible, and the
relative need for implementation of environmental controls to protect
those uses from the adverse consequences of existing and future point
and nonpoint sources.
A tribe's choice of uses is an important step in the process of
protecting the quality of the reservation environment. Once the tribe has
adopted designated uses under the CWA, it is difficult to downgrade or
remove uses absent a substantial showing of non-attainability. 130 Tribes
may adopt WQS more stringent than necessary to meet the minimum
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1989). These minimum uses are loosely referred to as the
"fishable/swimmable" goals. EPA WQS GuiDE supra note 118, at 1.
125. EPA WQS GuID, supra note 118. at 7.
126. Id.
at 7.
127. Id.at 7-8.
128. Id.at 7.
129. Id. at 8. Tribes may avoid devoting excessive resources to attainability analyses by
incorporating, where possible, analyses done by adjacent states for similar uses on common water
bodies. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 64.876, 64,889 (1991) (suggesting that tribes borrow adjacent state
water quality standards where helpful).
130. EPA WQS GuiDE, supra note 118, at 7.
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fishable/swimmable goals. However, once adopted, a tribe may only
downgrade use by showing that attainingthe use is not feasible. 13 1
2. Establishment of Water Quality Criteria
The tribe's use designations essentially establish the tribe's goals
for attaining and maintaining a certain level of water quality for the
identified surface waters. The mechanisms to achieve those goals are
water quality criteria, which are designed to protect the designated
uses.132 Water quality criteria are specific limits on particular pollutants
or on the condition of a water body. Compliance with properly selected
criteria should achieve a degree of water quality sufficient to protect
designated uses. 133
The tribe may set criteria under any method based on sound
science, 134 or it may look to criteria developed by EPA as guidance,
modifying that criteria where necessary to reflect site specific conditions. 13 5 Consistent with the CWA's fishable/swimmable goals, EPA's
criteria focus on the effects of pollutants on aquatic life and human
health.136 EPA's criteria offer the tribe two types of useful information:
(1) scientific data on the effects of pollutants on aquatic life, human
health, and/or recreation; and (2) the specific chemical concentration in
water that should achieve adequate water quality to support designated
uses. 137 Because tribes are required to designate fishable/swimmable
uses, they must adopt aquatic life and human health criteria for any
pollutants which data shows may interfere with attaining the designated
uses. 138
Effective tribal criteria usually contain both narrative and numeric
water quality criteria. Narrative criteria are statements of acceptable
pollutant concentrations without reference to defined units or requirements. 139 A common example of a narrative statement is the provision
that toxic material concentrations in surface waters shall be below those
which "may adversely affect characteristic water uses." 140 Narrative

131. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10(g), (h) (1994).
132. Id. § 131.2.
133. Id. § 131.1 1(a).
134. Id. § 131.11(b).
135. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (1991).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1989).
137. EPA WQS GutDE, supra note 118, at 8-9.
138. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(a) (1994).
139. EPA WQS GunDE, supra note 118, at 9.
140. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-201-045(l)(c)(ii)(B)(vii) (providing the water quality standards
for the State of Washington).
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criteria are often used where numeric criterion for a specific chemical is
not available or where the chemicals in a toxic effluent cannot be
identified. 14 1 When a tribe adopts narrative criteria for toxic pollutants,
however, it must show EPA how the tribe will use the criteria to regulate
142
point sources.
Compared to narrative standards, numeric criteria are more easily
understood and enforced. These criteria establish specific chemical
43
concentrations in water of various pollutants. 1 For example, a numeric
criterion might require that dissolved oxygen exceed 9.5 mg/1,144 or that
pH shall be within the range of 6.5 to 8.5.145 In addition, the tribe must
discharge of
adopt numeric criteria for certain toxic pollutants,14 6 where
147
uses.
designated
affect
those pollutants may adversely
3.

Adoption of an Antidegradation Policy

Apart from either narrative or numeric water quality criteria, the
tribe must also adopt an antidegradation policy.148 An antidegradation
policy seeks to maintain existing levels of water quality and proscribes
any significant reduction in such water quality which would threaten
existing uses. 14 9 Normally the policy would be reservation-wide, with
implementation methods intended to preserve existing uses and high
quality waters. 150 Whenever a discharge is found to eliminate a use or
degrade high quality waters, the tribe must conduct an antidegradation
policy review to ensure that actions taken are consistent with the CWA's
goals. 15 1
C.

APPLICATION AND APPROVAL PROCESS FOR TRIBAL STANDARDS

1. Preparationof Standards Package
A tribe's application to EPA for delegation of section 303 authority
is referred to as a "standards package." The package includes all
relevant material upon which the Regional Administrator approves or

141. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b)(2) (1994).
142. Id.§ 131.11(a)(2).
143. Id.§ 131.11(b)(l).
144. Id.§ 131.35(f)(1)(ii)(B) (containing federal WQS for the Colviile Reservation).
145. Id.§ 131.35 (f)(l)(ii)(E) (containing federal WQS for the Colville Reservation).
146. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1988) (providing EPA numeric criteria for 'priority pollutants'
pursuant to section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 131.1I(a)(2) (1994).
148. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (1994).
149. Id.§ 131.12(a)(1), (2).
150. Id.
151. EPA WQS GUIDE, supra note 118, at 11.
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disapproves delegation of the section 303 program to the tribe. 15 2 Thus,
tribes should carefully assess their standards packages to ensure
responsiveness to EPA's requirements.
The tribe's standards package must include:
1. Use designations consistent with sections 101(a)(2) and
303(c)(2) of the CWA;
2.. Water quality criteria sufficient to protect the designated uses;
3. Scientifically defensible methods and analyses used to establish
the WQS;
4. An antidegradation policy and implementation methods that
are consistent with EPA's regulation;
5. A certification by the tribal attorney that the WQS were
adopted in accordance with tribal law; and
6. Scientifically defensible information on the basis for standards
that do not include the minimum fishable/swimmable uses. 153
Notwithstanding a tribe's own procedure for adopting rules, EPA
requires that the tribe hold a public meeting to review the proposed
WQS.154 The meeting must proceed in accordance with both tribal law
and certain federal regulations.155 It should be open to all persons
affected by standards decisions, including nonmembers, non-Indians,
and state representatives.1 56 Prior to the meeting, the tribe must make
available to the public the proposed WQS and supporting scientific
analyses .157
Public input may reveal shortcomings in the proposed WQS and
necessitate changes. Once finalized, the tribe adopts or enacts the WQS
according to tribal law.15 8 The tribal attorney then certifies that the WQS
were adopted consistent with tribal law. 159
2.

EPA's Approval Process

152. Including, under EPA's new program eligibility rule, the tribe's description of its satisfaction
of the CWA's requirements for program delegation. See supra Part III A, B (discussing tribal
eligibility to receive CWA program delegation and tribal water quality development).
153. EPA WQS GUIDE, supra note 118, at 13.
154. See 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,103-104 (1989). In addition to narrative and numeric water
quality criteria, "proposed water quality standards" as used here includes water body use designations,
antidegradation policies, and methods and information concerning the scientific basis of the standards.
Id. at 39,099.
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.6(e), 115,131.20(a), (b) (1994).
156. 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(b) (1994); EPA WQS GuuDE, supra note 118, at 13.
157. EPA WQS GuIDE, supra note 118, at 13.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Because tribes are treated as states for purposes of section 303
delegation, EPA reviews tribal WQS under the same statutory and
regulatory requirements that it uses to review state standards. Fundamentally, EPA considers whether the proposed tribal WQS are consistent
with the CWA and EPA's regulations.160 EPA also determines whether
the scientific analyses performed to establish the WQS were adequate.161
Also important to EPA is whether the tribe's designated uses and criteria
are compatible throughout the water body and whether existing
62
downstream water quality standards are protected.1
If EPA finds the tribal standards in compliance with the CWA and
EPA's water quality regulations, then it approves the standards by letter
to the tribal chairperson.1 63 If the Administrator disapproves, then the
letter explains why the standards are inconsistent with the CWA and
64
describes how the tribe can revise the standards for full approval.1
Alternatively, the Administrator may approve the standards conditionally
so long as the tribe agrees to complete any minor revisions required by
16 5
the Administrator within a specified time.
IV. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF EPA'S APPROVAL OF TRIBAL
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
A.

EPA APPROVAL FILLs
WATERS

REGULATORY VOID FOR RESERVATION

The most direct consequence of a tribe's development of WQS is
that the tribe thereby fills a regulatory void in the CWA that, despite
EPA's trust obligation to protect the health and welfare of tribal
members and the quality of the reservation environment, has existed for
more than twenty years.166 In one sense, the fundamental structure of
the 1972 FWPCA created that void. For example, a central component
of the FWPCA was the application of WQS to every water body for which
uses are sought to be preserved. Such WQS were to provide the legal
and regulatory bases for point source and non-point source water-quality based controls, and to supplement the FWPCA's technological
requirements for certain sources. 167 The 1972 Congress recognized that

160. Id. at 15.
161. Id.
162. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,890 (1991).
163. EPA WQS GuiDE, supra note 118, at 15.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (discussing the federal policy behind protecting the
quality of reservation waters).
167. EPA WQS GuIDE, supranote 118, at 1;see supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
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many states had previously adopted WQS under state law, 16 8 and it
desired to preserve the primary responsibility of states to prevent and
eliminate water pollution. 169 Thus, Congress directed the states to submit
their existing WQS for EPA approval, 170 or if state WQS did not exist, to
develop and submit them to EPA within 180 days of the FWPCA's
enactment. 171
Congress also directed EPA to promulgate federal criteria for water
quality reflecting the latest scientific information on the processes
through which pollutants migrate and concentrate in waters, and the
identifiable impacts of such pollutants on public health and welfare, and
the environment. 172 The purpose of the federal criteria was to guide the
states in developing their WQS, but the criteria were not self-executing;
that is, in the absence of state or federal WQS implementing them, the
federal criteria did not establish any legally enforceable standards.1 7 3
Where a state failed to submit WQS within the required timeframes, or
where EPA found a state's proposed standards inconsistent with the
FWPCA, Congress expected EPA to propose and promulgate federal
WQS for state waters. 174 EPA's expressed policy, however, was not to
promulgate federal standards, but rather to work with states to accomplish consistency of state WQS with the federal requirements.1 75
With varying degrees of diligence, the states responded to Congress'
directives. But the states' actions or inactions did not and could not
establish WQS for waters in Indian Country. Nothing in the FWPCA
suggested that Congress delegated authority to states to regulate the
waters of Indian reservations. 17 6 As a matter of federal Indian law,
absent that delegation or some independent source of jurisdiction, states
generally lack authority to impose their regulatory schemes on Indian
lands. 17 7 EPA has consistently taken that position with respect to
168. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64, 889 (1991).
169. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
170. Id. § 1313(a)(2).
171. Id.§ 1313(a)(3).
172. Id. § 1314(a).
173. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (1991). Nor should the standards be self executing. The
federal criteria are necessarily set without reference to the site-specific factors that states and tribes
would normally consider in developing WQS.
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1988).
175. Cf. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,891 (1991) (explaining EPA's intent to use the same policy to
assist tribes in developing WQS rather than promulgating federal WQS for Indian lands).
176. See 54 Fed. Reg. 28,622 (1989) ("The CWA does not, by itself, authorize States to
implement or enforce water quality managemment progrms on Indian lands.").
177. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987)
(asserting that state must show exceptional circumstances to impose civil regulatory laws on Indians on
the reservation). This issue is far more complicated and much less absolute than the text's broad
assertion implies. For a more detailed analysis of the scope of state jurisdiction over activities
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implementing federal environmental programs, refusing to approve state
programs asserting any applicability or control over the reservation
environment. 17 8 Challenges to EPA's position have been uniformly
rejected by the federal courts. 17 9
Prior to the addition of section 518 in the 1987 CWA Amendments,
and given EPA's position that states lack authority to implement state
WQS on Indian lands, a casual observer might logically have assumed
that EPA would then promulgate federal WQS for Indian waters on a
reservation by reservation basis. After all, EPA has a trust obligation to
protect the reservation environment as well as a mandatory duty to
promulgate WQS where necessary to meet the requirements of the
CWA.180 In fact, EPA took such action only once for one reservation,
and not until after the tribe insisted and seventeen years had passed since
enactment of the FWPCA.181 In 1989, EPA explained its reasoning for
not promulgating federal WQS for Indian waters on two grounds: (1)
federal promulgation is "a very deliberate process;"1 82 and (2) federal
promulgation would be inconsistent with section 518's intention of
providing tribes with the first opportunity to set WQS for reservation
waters. 183
So when a tribe demonstrates its eligiblity for program approval and
develops WQS, it fills a regulatory void in the implementation of the
CWA that states could not and EPA refused to fill. For tribes who issue
conducted by Indians and non-Indians within the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations, see Judith
V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy,
FederalDelegation,and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581,600-13 (1989).
178. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (1988) (denying approval of the portion of the State of
Washington's RCRA program purporting to apply to Indian lands in Washington). Note, however, that
as a stop-gap measure, EPA adopted a policy of applying state WQS purporting to apply to reservation
waters for purposes of determining the conditions for federally-issued permits for discharges into
reservation waters. See 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,104 (1989) (quoting September 9, 1988 letter from
EPA General Counsel Lawrence Jensen to Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of the State of
Oregon).
179. See, e.g., Washington v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1985).
180. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)(B) (1988) (stating that EPA must prepare WQS where
such standards are necessary to meet CWA requirements), with 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,103 (1989)
(stating that EPA would have "a responsibility" to promulgate federal WQS for Indian lands in the
absense of tribal WQS).
181. 54 Fed. Reg. 28,622 (1989) (adopting WQS enacted under tribal law by the Colville Indian
Nation for reservation waters and promulgating them as federal WQS).
182. Id. at 39,103. Despite the fact that the Colville Nation had previously inventoried
reservation waters, assigned uses, and developed WQS to preserve those uses, it took EPA three years
from the Nation's request to promulgate the Nation's WQS as federal standards. Id. at 28,622.
183. 54 Fed. Reg. 39,699 (1989). Of course. EPA's invocation of section 518 as a reason for not
promulgating federal WQS supports only post-1991 decisions, the year EPA promulgated its rule for
delegating section 303 authority to tribal governments. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991). Thus, EPA's
inaction over the 19 years from the FWPCA's enactment to the final rule allowing tribes to develop
WQS under the CWA is based solely on EPA's view that federal promulgation is a difficult and
time-consuming process. No doubt that view is correct, but it does not justify EPA's breach of its trust
obligation to protect reservation environments nor EPA's violation of section 303(c)(4)(B)'s
requirement to promulgate federal standards necessary to meet the requirements of the CWA.
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permits under tribal law or certain CWA programs,18 4 their WQS will
provide the legal basis for conditions included in the permits to protect
water quality.185 Discharges allowed under federal permits must also
comply with tribal WQS.186 Tribal WQS provide the standards that
trigger federal enforcement power to enjoin discharges in violation of
the WQS.187 Tribal WQS also animate the implementation of the CWA's
non-point source management programs, by identifying those
reservation waters that require the application of "best management
practices" to non-point sources of pollution to ensure compliance with
WQS.188

B.

EPA

APPROVAL RECOGNIZES TRIBE'S INHERENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER

THE RESERVATION ENVIRONMENT

A second consequence of a tribe's development of WQS is EPA's
acknowledgment of the tribe's sovereign governmental power to adopt
WQS more stringent than those required by the CWA. The CWA
establishes a nation-wide minimum standard: state, tribal, or federal
WQS must seek to attain water quality adequate to provide for the
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and provide
for recreation in and on the waters of the United States. 18 9 But in
deference to the states' sovereign authority to protect their waters, and in
recognition that site-specific factors may warrant regulatory variations,
section 510 preserves states' power to (1) adopt WQS more stringent
than necessary to protect the minimum CWA uses and (2) designate
additional uses. 190 Hence, EPA may not disapprove a state's proposed
WQS simply because they exceed the level necessary to meet the CWA's
requirements. 191
EPA interprets section 510 as similarly limiting its authority with
respect to tribal WQS. Although section 518 does not expressly
reference section 510, it also does not expressly preempt tribes' inherent
184. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,966 (1993) (promulgating final rules for the procedures under which
tribes may seek delegation of the section 402 NPDES permit program); 58 Fed. Reg. 8,172 (1993)
(promulgating final rules for the section 404 dredge and fill permit program).
185. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(l)(C), 1342(a)(3) (1988).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 212-19 (discussing conditions of licensing).
187. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1988) (stating that the Administrator may take action when an
individual violates the terms of a permit).
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (1988).
189. Id. § 1251(a)(2) (denoting fishable/swimmable uses).
190. Id. § 1370; International Paper v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (providing that section 510
of the Clean Water Act does not impair the states from implementing more stringent standards).
191. 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 839,099 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C F.R. pt. 131) (proposed Sept. 22,
1984). EPA urges states and tribes not to adopt WQS that are more stringent than natural background
water quality. Id.
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sovereign authority to adopt pollution control standards for reservation
waters that are more stringent than federal standards. The legislative
history of section 518 suggests that Congress intended tribes to exercise
the same regulatory authority over water quality as the states, and to
"assure fishable and swimmable water and to satisfy all beneficial
uses."'192 In conjunction with section 518's recognition that a tribe and
a state may set different WQS for the same water body, 19 3 EPA interprets
the legislative history as supporting the conclusion that tribes possess
section 510 authority.1 94 That conclusion is also consistent with EPA's
Indian Policy favoring tribal primary responsibility for the quality of
reservation environments, and puts tribes on relatively equal footing with
states.195
The significance of applying section 510 to tribal governments is
twofold. First, it recognizes simply that tribal governments possess the
sovereign authority to determine, within the parameters of and consistent
with the CWA, the extent to which protection of water quality for
reservation waters is important. A tribal government's unconsidered
conformity to the federal minimum standards, without analyzing
site-specific factors like the present quality of certain reservation waters,
or the appropriate balance between economic development-type uses
and environmental protection-type uses, 19 6 would be nothing short of an
abdication of its public trust obligation to its citizens. Second, the
applicability of section 510 to tribal WQS means that EPA will respect a
tribe's decision to adopt WQS more stringent than an adjacent state's
WQS for the same water body. More specifically, EPA will not force a
tribe to lower its WQS merely because an adjacent state's less stringent
WQS poses a conflict or causes a dispute.197
Because differing WQS for the same water body may cause disputes,
however, section 518 directs EPA to establish a mechanism for resolving
"unreasonable consequences" arising as a result of differing tribal and
192. 133 Cong. Rec. S1003 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (statement of Senator Burdick) (emphasis
added).
193. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(3) (1988). Congress directed EPA to establish a mechanism for
resolving any "unreasonable consequences" arising from the appliaition of differing WQS set by
tribes and states for the same waters. id.
194. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (1991). At least one federal district court has deferred to
EPA's interpretation as reasonable. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 739-40
(D.NAM. 1993) (finding that EPA's stated policy authorizes tribes to implement WQS that are more
stringent than federal standards).
195. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,886 (1991).
196. For example, the tribe may consider potential economic impacts in designating uses of
reservation waters, but once those uses are designated, the tribe must develop water quality criteria
that support those uses without regard to economic impacts. Id.
197. Id. at 64,886-87 (refusing to disapprove "overly stringent" tribal WQS as a means to resolve
disputes between states and tribes).
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state standards set for common water bodies.1 9 8 Where such consequences cause a dispute, either the tribe or the state may petition the
appropriate EPA Regional Administrator to resolve the dispute.199 The
written request to EPA must include a specific statement of the problem,
including the standards at issue and any factual data showing the alleged
consequences.200 Only the tribe or the state can initiate the process; EPA
lacks authority to force either party to the negotiating table. 20 1
The Administrator may grant the request if unreasonable consequences have in fact resulted, the parties have made a good faith effort to
solve the problem, and the relief sought is consistent with the CWA.202
Once the Administrator determines EPA involvement is appropriate, the
Administrator must make efforts to notify other interested parties of the
action, and may allow landowners, permit holders, citizen groups, or
other entities to participate.203
The dispute resolution process may take one of three forms. With
EPA acting as a neutral facilitator, tribes may participate in mediation
with the intent of establishing cooperative enforcement agreements with
the state. 20 4 Alternatively, tribes may participate in nonbinding
arbitration where the arbitrator presents to the parties a written recommendation for resolution.205 The final alternative for tribes is simply
not to participate, in which case EPA will attempt to resolve the issue as
fairly as possible without the participation of all parties.206
C.

CONTROLS THE ON AND OFF-RESERVATION ACTIVITIES OF NONINDIANS THAT AFFECT THE WATER QUALITY OF RESERVATION

WATERS

The most compelling consequence of tribal WQS approved under
the CWA is that, with respect to protecting the quality of reservation
waters, tribal WQS equalize some of the power imbalances between tribes,
the federal government, and adjacent state governments. Absent a
198. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988). The term 'unreasonable consequences' is not defined in EPA's
regulations. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,888 (1988) (EPA's explanation for leaving term undefined).
199. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7(c) (1994).
200. Id.
201. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,888 (1991) (stating that "EPA believes it does not have the
authority to force a Tribe or State into arbitration or mediation").
202. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7(b) (1994) The Code of Federal Regulations also gives other reasons for
granting the request. Id.
203. Id. § 131.7(d); see 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,888 (1991).
204. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7(f)(1) (1994).
205. Id. § 131.7()(2). Tribes may agree to be bound by the arbitrator's recommendation. Id. §
131.7()(2)(ii).
206. Id. § 131.7()(3).
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showing of inconsistency with the CWA, neither EPA nor adjacent states
may second-guess the value judgments tribal governments make as to
the uses to which reservation waters should be put, or the criteria by
which those uses will be protected. 20 7 More importantly, tribal WQS give
a tribe a significant measure of control over how federal and state
agencies implement their respective CWA programs to the extent that
such implementation affects the quality of reservation waters.208
1. FederalPermits for On-Reservation Non-Indian
Discharges
20 9
Absent delegation of certain CWA permit programs to tribes,
federal agencies retain the authority and responsibility to issue permits to
applicants whose on-reservation activities affect the quality of reservation
waters. For example, where EPA has not delegated to a tribe the section
402 NPDES permit program, EPA retains authority to issue permits to
2 10
point source discharges of pollutants into reservation waters.
Similarly, where a tribe has not obtained section 404 permit authority,
the Army Corps of Engineers retains the authority to issue dredge and
fill permits for activities on reservation lands. 2 11 Yet, both federal
agencies may only issue permits that ensure that the discharge will
comply with applicable tribal WQS.
Applicants for federally-issued permits or licenses for
on-reservation discharges must submit to the issuing agency a "certification" from the tribe that proposed limits and conditions in the federal
permit or license will ensure that the discharge complies with tribal
WQS.212 The tribe has three options after examining the application or
other information relevant to the proposed discharge's impact on water
quality: (1) the tribe certifies that the proposed discharge (made in
compliance with the terms of the proposed permit) will comply with
tribal WQS and other CWA requirements; (2) the tribe certifies that the
proposed discharge will comply with applicable WQS upon the permit's

207. See infra text accompanying notes 214-18.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 214-18, 225-32, 252-59.
209. See supra note 30 (discussing EPA rules for delegation to tribes of other CWA programs).
210. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988) (stating that the Administrator may issue a permit for the
discharge of any pollutant).
211. Id. § 1344(a).
212. Id. § 1341(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 124.51(c) (1994). EPA also has an independent duty to
confirm that NPDES permits it issues ensure the attainment of applicable WQS, including tribal WQS.
See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(C) (1988) (permitted discharges must achieve any more stringent standard
necessary to attain WQS established pursuant to state law under the authority of section 510); 40
C.F.R. §§ 122.A(a), (d) (1994) (stating that NPDES permits must ensure the attainment of applicable
WQS of all "affected" states); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,890 (1991) (finding that "affected states"
includes affected tribes who satisfy section 518's delegation provision).
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incorporation of additional specified conditions; or (3) the tribe denies
certification because the proposed discharge cannot comply with
213
applicable WQS even with additional conditions.
The federal agency may not veto or override the tribe's determination that a proposed discharge will violate tribal WQS. 2 14 Hence, if the
tribe denies certification for a particular discharge, section 401 of the
2 15
CWA prohibits the federal agency from issuing the permit or license,
and the applicant cannot (legally) discharge pollutants into reservation
waters. An applicant might directly challenge the tribe's certification
2 16
decision, but she would do so in tribal court under tribal law.
A tribal government has similar power over the issuing federal
agency when the tribe determines that compliance with tribal WQS can
be attained but only through imposition of additional terms and
conditions in the permit or license. Conditions determined by the tribe
to be necessary to comply with WQS are integral to the tribe's certification, and thus become part of the federal permit. 217 The issuing federal
agency generally lacks discretion to change the terms of the tribe's
certification, as these are matters within the expertise and responsibility
of the tribal water quality agency.218 This is true even where EPA
believes that the tribe's conditions may be more stringent than necessary
to meet tribal WQS. 2 19
In a sense, tribal WQS return to the tribe what the Supreme Court
the (federally-enforceable)
took away in the twentieth century:
on fee lands that risk
activities
regulatory power to prohibit non-Indian
213. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988). Actually, the tribe has a fourth option-waiver of
certification- which occurs if the tribe fails or refuses to act on the request for certification within
one year. Id.
214. See In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 58 Op. of EPA General Counsel 337, 338 (1977) (stating
that the EPA has no authority to determine if the state law regulations are too stringent).
215. Id., 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,890 (1991); United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96,
98 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding Massachusett's decision to deny certification on the ground that
applicable state WQS would be violated by the proposed discharge).
216. Cf. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,882 (1991) (stating that EPA does not require tribes to provide
judicial review for section 401 certifications because such decisions are based on tribal not federal
law).
217. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(l), (d).
218. See, e.g., Lake Erie v. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(finding that certification is the exclusive perogative of the state); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 426 F.
Supp. 230, 234-35 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (determining that Congress intended for the states to play a
paramount role in the certification process).
219. See, eg., Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982)
(finding that EPA has no authority to determine if the state levels are more stringent than necessary),
see supra note 214. EPA has interpreted section 301(b)(1)(C), however, as imposing on it an
independent duty to impose permit conditions EPA beleives are necessary to meet applicable state or
tribal WQS, even where the state's or tribe's certification proposes less stringent conditions. See
supra note 214, at 337-38.
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an unacceptable degree of harm to the quality of tribal waters. 2 20 This is
true even in instances where the federal permitting agency would
otherwise allow the activities to occur.
Although indirect, the tribe's authority under section 401 to
condition a discharger's operations is significant. First, the tribal
conditions reflect the tribe's, not the federal agency's, interpretation of
tribal WQS and determination of the requirements necessary to comply
with those standards. Second, apart from any question of the tribe's
jurisdiciton to regulate the non-Indian permittee directly, the tribe's
conditions become federal permit conditions enforceable by EPA under
federal law. Permit violations are violations of the CWA, which carry
federal civil and criminal penalties,221 and risk permit revocation or
termination. 2 22 Third, the mechanics of the certification process
encourage (if not require) the dissatisfied applicant to sue the federal
agency who incorporated the tribe's conditions in the federal permit,
rather than suing the tribe itself. Such litigation will likely fail on
general principles of judicial deference to administrative agencies, but
perhaps more importantly from the tribe's perspective, will not directly
challenge the tribe's regulatory authority over the applicant, nor the
wisdom of the tribe's WQS or its conditions. 22 3
The impact of section 401 authority, then, is apparent. A tribe with
federally-approved WQS can exert substantial -albeit indirect- authority over whether and under what conditions on-reservation discharges
occur. But the legal and practical consequences of tribal WQS are even
broader; in some instances the tribe can also influence the manner in
which discharges outside tribal territories are permitted. That is, for
perhaps the first time, federal law recognizes the need and offers the

220. Of course, tribal WQS also are effective to regulate the conduct of Indian actors on trust
lands.
221. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c), (d) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(a), (a)(2) (1994) (stating
that CWA violations carry civil penalties of $25,000 per day per violation and criminal penalties of
$25,000 per day per violation and/or one year imprisonment). Of course, whether EPA prosecutes
such a violation is a matter outside the tribe's control. However, evidence shows that EPA's
enforcement efforts are less frequent and result in less severe penalties in areas populated by
minorities. See Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, The Federal Government, in its Cleanup of
Hazardous Sites and its Pursuit of Polluters, Favors White Communities over Minority Communities
Under Environmental Laws Meant to Provide Equal Protection for All Citizens, A National Law Journal
Investigation Has Found, 15 NAT'L L. J. S2 (1992). Yet, the discharger is more likely to be deterred
by the threat of federal enforcement and the magnitude of the CWA penalites than the threat of tribal
enforcement, for which the jurisdictional basis is potentially questionable, and the maximum penalty is
$5.000. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988) (stating that a conviction is punishable by one year
imprisonment, a fine of $5,00, or both).
222. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a) (1994).
223. See, e.g., Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 738 (D. N.M.1993) (challenging
EPA's approval of the Pueblo of Isleta's WQS and EPA's decision to incorporate the Pueblo's
conditions in a draft NPDES permit).
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opportunity for a tribal government to protect its citizens and the
reservation environment from off-reservation activities that are likely to
affect them adversely.
2.

FederalPermits for Off-Reservation Non-Indian
Discharges

Where a state and a tribe set identical WQS for a common water
body, the state's section 401 certification for a proposed federally-permitted discharge to upstream state waters might logically imply that
the discharge would probably also comply with the downstream tribe's
WQS.224 But because tribal governments have section 510 authority, the
downstream tribe's WQS may be more stringent than the state's WQS for
the same water body. In that instance, the state's section 401 certification probably would not be helpful in determining whether the
(upstream) state-based discharge will comply with the tribal WQS.
Cognizant of such situations, the CWA directs EPA to determine if a
proposed discharge "may affect" the quality of the waters of any state
other than the one in which the discharge is made.225 Under section 518,
that directive requires EPA to determine whether a proposed federallypermitted discharge in an upstream state may affect the water quality of
a downstream tribe (with approved WQS).226 If EPA so determines, then
EPA must notify the "affected" tribe of the proposed discharge, 2 27 and
provide the tribe with a copy of the permit application and supporting
documentation .228
The tribe then evaluates the proposed discharge to determine if it
will cause a violation of tribal WQS, and if so, the tribe may object and
request a hearing.229 The permitting agency has a mandatory duty to
hold a public hearing upon receiving a timely request from the
downstream tribe.230 If EPA is not the permitting agency, EPA must
evaluate the tribe's objection and recommend to the permitting agency
whether and under what conditions the license or permit should be

224. Assuming there are no intervening sources between the point of discharge and the
downstream tribe's reservation.
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
226. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,890 (1991).
227. 40 C.F.R. § 121.13 (1994).
228. Id. § 121.14.
229. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988). The downstream tribe may only object to permit issuance on
the ground that it will violate tribal WQS. See Op. of General Counsel, 155-56 (1973).
230. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). The downstream tribe has 60 days from the date of EPA notice to the
tribe to make its objection and request for a hearing. Id.
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The permitting agency is not bound to accept EPA's

recommendations, but it must condition the permit in a manner
necessary to meet all applicable WQS, including the WQS of a tribe
downstream from the proposed discharge .232 If such conditions cannot
ensure compliance with those WQS, the permitting agency may not issue
2 33
the permit.
3.

A Case in Point: Albuquerque v. Browner 2 34

A recent example partially illustrates the significance of tribal WQS.
In 1991, the Pueblo of Isleta chose to exercise its inherent police power
to protect the quality of its reservation waters by drafting WQS for the
portion of the Rio Grande lying within the reservation. 235 The Pueblo
scheduled a public hearing on the draft WQS, inviting the comments of
interested parties, including non-members and local governments.236 On
the basis of comments submitted, including comments from EPA, the
Pueblo revised its draft WQS and promulgated them as final WQS under
tribal law in February 1992.237 Several of the final WQS were more
stringent than the relevant state standards applicable to the Rio
Grande. 23 8 On December 24, 1992, EPA approved the Pueblo's WQS as
consistent with section 303(c) of the CWA.239
The City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, owns and operates a
wastewater treatment plant that discharges pollutants into the Rio Grande
five miles upstream from the Pueblo's reservation. The City's discharge
231. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 121.15 (1994). If EPA is the permitting agency, then it must include limits
necessary to achieve compliance with tribal WQS. See Memorandum from Cynthia C. Dougherty,
Director, Permits Division, Guidance on EPA's NPDES and Sludge Management Permit Procedures on
Federal Indian Reservations, to Water Management Division Directors 5 (Nov. 16, 1993).
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988); cf. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55 (1992)
(although not reaching the question of whether the CWA requires EPA to condition a permit so as to
ensure compliance with a downstream state's WQS, upholding EPA's decision to do so as a
reasonable exercise of EPA's authority under the CWA).
233. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
234. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993).
235. The Rio Grande flows through the exterior boundaries of the Pueblo of Isleta's reservation
on its journey from northern New Mexico, along the border of Texas and Mexico, to the Gulf of
Mexico. The Rio Grande Peublos, of which Isleta is one, may have settled on the Rio Grande as early
as 900 A.D. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pueblo of Isleta at 4-5, Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp.
733 (D. N.M. 1993) (No. 93-82M) [hereinafter Isleta Brief] (citing sources). Traditional uses of the
river by the Pueblo included irrigation, fishing, cutural and spiritual uses. Id.
236. EPA's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Albuquerque v.
Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.M. 1993) (No. 93-82M) [hereinafter EPA's Summary Judgment
Memorandum]. The CWA requires states developing WQS to be approved under the CWA to provide
an opportunity for public participation in the adoption or revision of WQS. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(l)
(1988).
237. EPA's Summary Judgment Memorandum, supra note 236, at 9.
238. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
239. EPA's Summary Judgement Memorandum, supra note 236, at 11. The Pueblo was the first
tribe whose WQS were approved by EPA. Id.
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is regulated by an NPDES permit issued by EPA.240 At the time when
EPA approved the Pueblo's WQS, EPA was in the process of revising the
conditions of the City's NPDES permit to reflect newly promulgated
state WQS.241 Consistent with its independent responsibility to ensure
that permitted discharges attain all applicable WQS, including those of
downstream states and tribes, EPA prepareda draft permit incorporating
several conditions necessary to ensure compliance with the Pueblo's
WQS.242

Before the final permit was issued, the City filed suit against EPA
indirectly challenging the additional permit conditions.243 The City
sought to preempt EPA's incorporation of the Pueblo's WQS into the
City's permit by attacking EPA's approval of the Pueblo's WQS under
several statutory and constitutional theories.244
The New Mexico federal district court rejected the City's challenge
and granted summary judgment to EPA. For purposes of this analysis,
there were three important rulings in the case. First, the court invoked
established administrative law principles to review EPA's determinations
under the arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards. 24 5
Those standards of review are highly deferential to the agency's view of
the CWA, asking essentially whether the agency acted reasonably and not
whether the agency was "right" or made a "good" decision.246
Second, under those administrative law principles, the court upheld
EPA's interpretation of both the procedure and substance of tribal WQS
under the CWA.247 Procedurally, the court upheld EPA's determination
that the CWA did not require EPA to provide notice and comment prior
to approving the Pueblo's WQS because the Pueblo had already
240. New Mexico has not sought delegation of the section 402 NPDES program, so EPA issues
all permits for covered point source discharges on state lands. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988).
241. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
242. Id. Because the City's discharge is off-reservation, the City was not required to obtain a
section 401 certification from the Pueblo. However, it is not clear whether EPA sought the Pueblo's
evaluation of conditions necessary after making a determination that the City's discharge was likely to
affect Pueblo waters, see supra text accompanying notes 225-28, or EPA simply incorporated the
conditions without Pueblo input. The fact that EPA incorporated the conditions in the draft permit
probably explains why there is no indication that the Pueblo submitted to EPA a formal objection to the
draft permit and a request for hearing.
243. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
244. Id. The City's preemptive litigation strategy derived from the Supreme Court's decision in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, which upheld EPA's decision to condition an Arkansas discharger's permit on
compliance with Oklahoma's downstream WQS. 112 S. Ct. at 1060-61 (1992).
245. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 737.
246. Id. See Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(stating that court's role is to determine whether Congress has spoken on the issue, and if not, to see if
the agency's construction of the statute is a permissible one).
247. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 737.
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provided notice and considered comments (including the City's
comments) in promulgating its WQS under tribal law, as required by the
CWA.248 Substantively, the court held that EPA reasonably interpreted
section 518 as including section 510's saving of a tribe's authority to
adopt WQS more stringent than the CWA minimum standards. 249 Thus,
federal law did not prohibit the Pueblo from adopting WQS more
stringent than the federal minima or New Mexico's counterpart
standards.
Finally, based on EPA's view of sections 518 and 510, the court
correctly refused to second-guess or even to require detailed explanation
for EPA's approval of several of the Pueblo's more stringent standards. 250 For instance, the Pueblo's arsenic standard is at least 1,000
times more stringent than both the federal Safe Drinking Water
standard 25 1 and the New Mexico standard. 252 Although the court found
the Pueblo's standard "troubling" in light of the naturally high
background levels of arsenic in the City's groundwater and the difficulty
in detecting arsenic at the level set by the Pubelo's standard, 253 the court
did not invalidate the standard. Similarly, the court refused to evaluate
the propriety of the Pueblo's fecal chloroform standard intended to
protect ceremonial uses, thereby respecting the Pueblo's decision not to
explain what ceremonial uses members make of the Rio Grande. 254
The moral of Browner is respect and its teaching is power. The
Pueblo of Isleta respected the Rio Grande as the source of life, and
sought to protect it by developing WQS. EPA respected the Pueblo's
value judgments in the appropriate uses of the Rio, and the criteria
necessary to protect them. The federal district court respected Congress'
intent to place the primary responsibility for setting pollution standards
for the reservation environment on the shoulders of those who will bear
the impact of its degradation. The power, of course, lies in the Rio.

248. Id. at 739.

249. Id. at 739-40.
250. Id. at 740-41.
251. Id. at 742.

252. City of Albuquerque's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement, at 19
(No. CV-93-82M) (filed June 11. 1995).
253. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 742.
254. Id. at 740 (equating the standard with "primary contact" standards that assume incidental
ingestion of water during use to reject the City's argument that the Pueblo's standard was in fact a
standard requiring drinking water quality, which the Pueblo allegedly could not attain).
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And, with decisions like Browner, it may flow there forever. 255
4.

State Permitsfor Off-Reservation Non-Indian Discharges

Also important, but perhaps less dramatic, is the action-forcing
impact of tribal WQS for state permit programs. State NPDES programs
must provide notice and an opportunity for public hearing for tribes
whose waters may be affected by the state's issuance of discharge
permits.256 Once the state has prepared a draft permit and a fact sheet
explaining the factual and legal context for the proposed discharge, the
state must send notice directly to affected tribes. 25 7 Those tribes may
comment on the proposed permit, and may request a public hearing if
258
one has not already been scheduled.
Unlike the section 401 certification process for federally-issued
permits, the state is not automatically bound to accept tribal comments
and incorporate suggested conditions in the state permit. However, the
state may not issue the permit if it does not include other conditions
ensuring compliance with applicable WQS of affected states and
tribes.259 Additionally, the state is required to notify both the tribe and
EPA if it refuses to accept the tribal conditions. 2 60 The state must
convince EPA that its reasons for such rejection are adequate, and if it
26
cannot, EPA may object to the issuance of the permit. 1
EPA's objection to the proposed state permit will be resolved in one
2 62
of three ways. First, the state may submit to EPA a revised permit.
Second, the state may request that EPA hold a public hearing at which
the objection and supporting materials will be evaluated. 26 3 If by either
of these methods the state meets EPA's objections, then it may issue the
255. But see Rosie Mestel, Pueblo IndiansInsist on Right to Clean River, 137 NEw SCIENTISTS 12
(March 20, 1993) ("[i]f the EPA wins the [Browner] case, it could encourage a new kind of
American Indian environmental activitism"). Such a view implies the racist assumption that tribal
governments are incapable of environmental regulation that is non-discriminatory and scientifically
defensible. But the view does inadvertently present the fundamental difference between the
approaches of tribal and state governments; whereas Indian people generally hold a world view that
includes and supports an environmental ethic stressing the relationship between humans and the
natural world, Euro-Americans encourage human alientation from and an exploitative relationship
with nature. See J. Biard Callicott, TraditionalAmerican Indian and TraiditionalWestern European
Attitudes Toward Nature: An Overview 231, in ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A COLLECTION OF
READINGS (1983).
256. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 123.25(a)(28) (1994).
257. 40 C.F.R. § 124.10(c)(l)(iii) (1994).
258. Id. § 124.11.
259. Id. § 122.4(d).
260. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
261. 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c)(2) (1994).
262. Id. § 123.45 (h)(1).
263. Id. § 123.45(e).
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permit. If not, the third method is for EPA to assume permitting
responsiblity for the purpose of issuing the permit. 264 Most important,
though, is that EPA's objection to the state's proposed permit stems
from the state's unwillingness to ensure that its discharger complies with
the tribe's WQS. The objection then blossoms into a forceful federal
mandate blocking permit issuance absent revisions to ensure compliance.
Beyond the issuance of particular discharge permits, tribal WQS
offer downstream tribes an indirect opportunity to influence the
adoption and revision of upstream WQS programs. In the absence of
downstream tribal WQS, the upstream state has no federal mandate to
consider the quality of downstream reservation waters; the state need
only adopt WQS that comply with the minimum CWA standards for EPA
approval. If, however, downstream tribal WQS exist, the state must
consider how its use designations and criteria determinations affect the
water quality of reservation waters.
Section 303(c)(1) of the CWA requires that the state give tribes who
share water bodies with the state notice of and an opportunity to
comment on new or revised state standards that may differ from relevant
tribal standards. 265 The state is free to accept or reject tribal comments,
but both new and revised WQS must be approved by EPA. EPA's review
and approval process will look to see if the state considered the WQS of
downstream waters and drafted the proposed state WQS to provide for
the attainment and maintenance of the downstream tribal WQS.266 If the
WQS do not so provide, EPA may reject them. 267
5.

Superfund Liabilityfor On and Off-Reservation Releases of
Hazardous Substances

There are at least two other important legal consequences to tribal
WQS. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act 2 6 8 ("CERCLA"), or "Superfund," makes parties
responsible for releasing hazardous substances into the environment
liable for the costs of cleaning up those substances and restoring any

264. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988); See Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
1988) (finding that state's failure to respond to EPA's objection justified EPA's assumption of
permitting responsibility).
265. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(b) (1994); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,
64,891-92 (1991) (EPA's expectation that state representatives will participate in public hearings
concerning tribal standards, and vice versa). At a similar programmatic level, EPA requires state
NPDES programs to provide an opportunity for affected states and tribes to submit written comments
on proposed permits. See supratext accompanying notes 253-55.
266. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(b) (1994); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,890 (1991).
267. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1988).
268. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
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injuries caused to natural resources.269 EPA is responsible for ensuring
that the cleanup protects human health and the environment. To do that,
CERCLA requires that EPA clean up hazardous waste sites to a degree
sufficient to achieve all applicable or relevant and appropriate pollution
standards ("ARARs").270 Federally-approved tribal WQS constitute
ARARs for sites impacting the water quality of reservation waters. Thus,
tribal WQS impose on EPA and responsible parties an obligation to
ensure that Superfund cleanups on and near the tribe's reservation
protect reservation water quality.
Second, tribal standards may also be significant under CERCLA's
natural resource damages provisions. CERCLA designates Indian tribes
as natural resource trustees and authorizes them to recover money
damages from parties responsible for injuries to tribal natural resources.271 Reservation surface water bodies are natural resources within the
scope of that authority. 27 2 To recover, tribal trustees must prove that the
party's hazardous substance came in contract with the water resource
and injured it.273 A "per se" injury to surface water resources is proven
by demonstrating exceedances of applicable tribal WQS.274
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision confronting an Indian tribe is whether it wants to take
primary responsibilty for protecting the quality of reservation waters, or
let EPA or someone else do it. Like any governmental policy decision,
answering the question requires prioritizing scarce human, monetary,
and other resources. Developing WQS and implementing other CWA
programs takes time, money, and effort. But the cultural, spritual, and
economic survival of the tribe often depends critically on water. Can
any tribe concerned about protecting its citizens afford to let others
make fundamental policy decisions about how much pollution
reservation waters should tolerate?
Environmental regulation is an exercise of governmental sovereignty. When a tribal government establishes WQS for reservation waters, it
269. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), (f)(1) (1992).
270. Id. § 9621(d)(2)(A).
271. See id. § 9626 (defining treatment of Indian tribes); id. § 9607(f) (creating liability for
damages to natural resources).
272. See id. § 9601(16).
273. Id. § 9607.(a)(4)(C).
274. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(b)(1) (1994) (defining per se injuries to surface waters under the
Department of the Interior's natural resource damage regulations). Similarly, tribal health advisories
related to natural resource uses issued pursuant to tribal standards constitute proof of injuries to
biological resources. See id. § 11.62(f)(3).
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discharges a trust obligation to its members-to protect their health and
welfare and the quality of the environment in which they live. Tribal
WQS reflect value judgments made by the tribe, not area directors or
bureaucrats. Tribal WQS thus contain the tribe's views on the proper
balance between economic development and environmental protection,
and the cultural, spriritual, and other uses of water that are importatant to
tribal members.
Tribal WQS also send a message to non-Indian residents of the
reservation, adjacent states, and Congress that environmental protection is
a priority for the tribe. Water pollution's migratory nature means that it
flows to and from Indian reservations. Thus, tribal WQS not only protect
tribal members and natural resources from water pollution, but they also
help protect downstream off-reservation users and resources. It is in this
sense that tribes help complete the circle of national clean water policy
by seeking delegation of CWA programs.
Tribes' failure to seize the window of opportunity presented by the
CWA and other federal environmental laws creates several very real risks.
First, the absence of established environmental standards renders the
reservation business environment highly uncertain; lack of predictability
in the face of unknown standards is likely to drive businesses and other
economic ventures to locate off-reservation. Second, EPA may not fill
that regulatory void by promulgating federal WQS; and even if it does,
those standards will reflect EPA's, not the tribe's, value judgments as to
the appropriate uses of reservation waters and the criteria necessary to
protect those uses. Third, tribal inaction risks judicial or legislative
activism to fill the perceived void. 275 Congress may decide that tribes do
not want or are incapable of taking primary responsibility for environmental regulation, and amend the federal laws to exclude tribal
governments. Or, more likely, courts may use tribal inaction as a flawed
basis to conclude that states have jurisdiction to implement environmental programs on reservations.
There are other less ethereal benefits to developing tribal WQS. The
process offers tribes valuable information about the nature and
characteristics of reservation waters, unique site-specific factors, and
existing and possible uses of those waters. That inventory helps identify
possible point sources of contamination, and may help identify best
management practices to address non-point sources. Working through
275. See Dean Suagee and Chris Stearns, Indigenous Self-Government, Environmental
Protection, and the Consent of the Governed: A Tribal Environmental Review Process, 5 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 59 (arguing that tribes should not assume that the current policy for
environmental protection in Indian Country will remain static if they do not accept the challenges it
presents).
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the process gives the tribe additional administrative and management
experience which may later demonstrate to EPA or BIA the tribe's
capability to administer other important federal programs on the
reservation. Also, EPA grants for developing WQS may asssist the tribe
in building tribal infrastructure, such as an environmental agency or
commission.
For all of Congress' failings to Indian people in the past, it has
provided in section 518 of the CWA a tremendous opportunity for tribal
governments to protect their members and the reservation environment.
Several tribes have taken the first step toward accepting that important
responsibility. Now is the time for other tribes to move to close the
circle of environmental protection for the nation's waters and people.

